Brazil is one of the largest multi-racial societies in the world, and the home of the largest single component of the overseas African diaspora. During the first half of the 1900s, it was frequently described, both by native-born and foreign observers, as a ‘racial democracy’, in which blacks, mulattoes, and whites lived under conditions of juridical and, to a large degree, social equality. During the second half of the century, however, that description has been sharply revised. From 1940 to the present, national censuses have documented persistent disparities between the white and non-white populations in education, vocational achievement, earnings, and life expectancy. Survey research has shown racist attitudes and stereotypes concerning blacks and mulattoes to be widely diffused throughout Brazilian society, and Afro-Brazilians report being the victims of subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, racism and discrimination. Thus while observers writing in the 1930s and 1940s focused on the harmonious, egalitarian quality of racial interaction in Brazil, similar discussions in the 1980s and 1990s have emphasized ‘the perception, ever more widespread, that [the concept of] “racial democracy”, in its official and semi-official versions, does not reflect Brazilian reality’. ‘The myth of racial democracy appears to be definitively in its grave’, observed the news-magazine Istóê during the celebrations marking the centennial of the abolition of slavery, in 1988; ‘racial discrimination’, not racial democracy, ‘is the basis of Brazilian culture’, argued historian Décio Freitas.

What accounts for this transformation in characterizations of Brazilian race relations? I have argued elsewhere that the disagreements and debates surrounding the concept of racial democracy in Brazil are closely tied to the tensions surrounding the theory and practice of political democracy in that country. Racial democracy was originally conceived as part of a larger ideo-
logical effort to justify authoritarian, oligarchical rule in Brazil. As that model of governance came under increasing attack after 1945, so too did the notion of Brazil as a racial democracy. And as the struggle against authoritarianism reached its climax in the 1980s, during the final years of the military dictatorship (1964–85), so too did portrayals of Brazil as a ‘South Africa without apartheid’, that is, a society lacking state-enforced racial segregation but nonetheless afflicted by extreme racial inequality.3

That explanation of the decline of racial democracy focused on internal factors specific to Brazil. In this article I would like to shift attention to the impact of external factors on Brazilian racial politics and racial thought. Transnational flows of ideas, images, practices, and institutions are an inescapable part of historical causation in all modern societies; and they have been particularly important in peripheral, Third World societies, which, because of their historic dependency, are strongly affected by, and pay close attention to, trends and events in the core countries. This dependency does not mean, however, that peripheral societies are the passive recipients of intellectual and political (or, for that matter, economic) forces and influences emanating from the core. Rather, they engage in a complex dialogue with metropolitan actors, sifting, evaluating, and reworking ideas and assertions imported from abroad into new and often quite original bodies of thought and prescriptions for action. All too often this is an essentially one-sided dialogue, in which core societies talk but do not listen. In the case of Brazilian race relations, however, scholars and intellectuals in the core countries did listen and pay attention to what was happening in Brazil.

This was especially the case in the United States, which, as it struggled with its own racial dilemmas, could not but note the very different path taken by the Latin American societies in general, and South America’s largest republic in particular. Brazilians, too, noted the difference, and, as with economic and political performance, measured their nation’s social progress in relation to that of their northern neighbour. The result was an extended, century-long conversation between the two countries — an American counterpoint, embracing both North and South America — on the topic of race. Given the disparities of power and influence between them, up until now the impact of that conversation has been greater in Brazil than in the United States. But its reverberations may be more strongly felt in the latter in years
to come, as the United States’ own system of race relations is increasingly seen as approximating that of Brazil.\(^4\)

The conversation began in the late 1800s with the arrival in Brazil of the North Atlantic doctrines of scientific racism, Social Darwinism, and, in its most extreme form, white racial supremacy. The response of Brazilian élites and intellectuals to these imported ideas was ambivalent. On the one hand, racial theories arrived in Brazil imbued with the full prestige of European science, and they also accorded with native Brazilian notions of white racial superiority. On the other hand, scientific racism’s vigorous condemnation of race mixture constituted a devastating criticism of Brazilian society — which as of 1890 was one-third mulatto, and majority non-white — and a bleak forecast of its future.

Some Brazilian thinkers — most notably ethnographer and medical doctor Raimundo Nina Rodrigues — accepted the dictates of scientific racism, including its assertions of ‘mulatto degeneracy’. (This despite the fact that Rodrigues was himself a person of mixed race.) Others, however, sought to escape the damming implications of racist theory by, in effect, extending its explanatory power in the form of the ‘whitening thesis’. Orthodox scientific racists asserted the superiority of white racial inheritance but also argued that that inheritance was weakened and undermined by mixture with ‘inferior’ races. ‘Whitening thesis’ revisionists such as João Batista de Lacerda, director of Brazil’s National Museum, responded that the scientific racists had too little faith in the power of white genes (or, in the language of the time, white ‘blood’). In cases of racial mixture, they argued, the white genetic component would tend to dominate; and if such mixture were repeated over several generations, the end result would be a ‘whitened’ population in which African and Indian ancestry was overcome and neutralized.\(^5\)

The whitening thesis saved Brazil from the gloomy prospect of racial degeneration and held out the hope of its one day being able to join the community of white nations. It also formed a powerful incentive to Brazilian policy-makers to speed up the process of whitening, or branqueamento, by excluding non-whites from Brazil’s genetic pool and increasing the European component. The 1891 constitution prohibited African and Asian
immigration into the country, and the federal and state governments of the First Republic (1891–1930) made concerted efforts to attract European immigration. These efforts bore fruit in the form of 2.5 million Europeans who migrated to Brazil between 1890 and 1914, 987,000 with their steamship passage paid for by state subsidies. After a lull during the first world war, another 847,000 Europeans arrived during the 1920s.6

Thanks to the immigrants, the national census of 1920 was able to confirm 'a tendency that is becoming more visible and defined: the tendency toward the progressive Aryanization of our regional groups. That is to say, the coefficient of the white race is becoming more and more elevated in our population.' Brazil's experience with whitening was conclusively disproving the scientific racists, one of whom (French anthropologist Vacher de Lapouge) had observed in 1890, the census noted, that 'one hundred years from now Brazil without a doubt will constitute an immense black state, unless, as is probable, it reverts to barbarism'. Viewing such predictions from the vantage point of 1920, 'we have the right, without a doubt, and without the slightest irreverence, to smile'.7

One suspects that the smile may have been a little forced. The confidence of the census's assertions was belied by the fact that the document contained no data whatsoever on the racial composition of the population, nor had any national census done so since 1890. Nevertheless, it was clear that whitening was having an impact on Brazilian society, introducing unanticipated tensions and conflicts. Native-born workers faced intense job competition from the immigrants, and objected strenuously to the open preference for Europeans displayed by many employers. Members of the Brazilian middle class, particularly skilled tradesmen and small retail merchants, faced similar competition from the immigrants and their children. And even employers and élites turned against the immigrants as the latter imported into Brazil the alien doctrines of anarchism and socialism and a new and more militant style of labour organization.8

By the 1920s and 1930s national disenchantment with immigration and Europeanization was abundantly clear. Right-wing xenophobia became a core element of middle-class political mobilization, culminating in the fascist-inspired Integralist movement, founded in 1932 in São Paulo, the state most affected by European immigration.9 São Paulo had already abolished its
programme of subsidies for European immigration in 1927, and in 1930 and 1931 the federal government placed restrictions on immigration into the country, as well as on the employment of foreign nationals in commerce and industry.\textsuperscript{10}

The effort to transform Brazil into a white, European society in the tropics had failed. In so doing, it reopened the question of the path of Brazil's future development, and the racial character of its national identity. In 1933 an answer was provided by intellectual and social theorist Gilberto Freyre, who resumed the dialogue between Brazil and its North Atlantic interlocutors, but now on different terms. The proponents of whitening had sought to Europeanize Brazil and make it white; Freyre, by contrast, accepted that Brazil was neither white nor European, and would never be either. Rather than Europe in the tropics, Brazil was destined to be a 'new world in the tropics': a uniquely American experiment in which Europeans, Indians, and Africans had come together to create a genuinely multi-racial and multi-cultural society.\textsuperscript{11}

Freyre had been a student in the United States in the 1910s and early 1920s, and had been horrified by the Jim Crow institutions and practices (including a lynching) which he witnessed while studying at Baylor University in Texas and travelling through the South.\textsuperscript{12} Recoiling from the violence and brutality of Southern segregation, he sought refuge in a vision of Brazil as a 'racial democracy', 'one of the most harmonious unions of culture with nature and of one culture with another that the lands of this hemisphere have ever known'.\textsuperscript{13} That union was both symbolized by and embodied in the racially mixed mulattoes, whom Freyre viewed not as a transitional stage on the road to national whiteness but rather as the most characteristically 'Brazilian' element of national society. He explicitly rejected the scientific racists' claims that 'the mulatto is incapable of achieving stability as the social and intellectual equal of the white man', responding that 'in the sense of corresponding more closely to the Brazilian milieu and of easier and possibly deeper adaptation to its interests, its tastes, its needs, the half-breed, the mulatto, or, to put it more delicately, the dark-complexioned person, would seem to show more capacity for leadership than the white or near white'. And as a result of that leadership, 'Brazil is becoming more and more a racial democracy, characterized by an almost unique combination of diversity and unity'.\textsuperscript{14}

The shock of Freyre's encounter with the racial hostility and
segregation of the United States led him to construct a vision of Brazil’s past (and, by extension, its present and future) that proved deeply appealing to many Brazilians. Scientific racism and its Brazilian variant, the whitening thesis, had viewed Brazil’s history of slavery and miscegenation, and the racially mixed population which was its legacy, as shameful obstacles that had to be overcome if Brazil were to enter the community of civilized nations. Freyre now rehabilitated that past, recasting it as the basis of a new national identity independent, for the first time in Brazilian history, of European norms and models. Indeed, as the profound evils of European racism were starkly revealed during the 1930s and 1940s, Brazilian racial democracy offered a promising and hopeful alternative.¹⁵

Freyre’s writings thus became the basis of a new, semi-official ideology propagated in public proclamations, schools and universities, and the national media. The ideology received a more mixed reception, however, from those who might have been expected to applaud it most warmly: the Afro-Brazilians. Black writers and intellectuals had been debating racial democracy since the 1880s, when mulatto writer Livio de Castro had anticipated Freyre’s arguments by asserting the ‘natural democratic impulse’ and ‘democratic spirit’ of Brazilian racial interaction. Race relations in Brazil ‘developed without any struggle between the races, thus avoiding the creation of a caste system like those of the ancient autocracies ... or of the North American confederation’.¹⁶ Castro’s citing of the United States was not accidental: like Freyre himself, the proponents of racial democracy were strongly motivated by their distaste for the United States’ system of race relations, on which they relied heavily to demonstrate the distinctiveness and superiority of the Brazilian system. In several articles and a short book published during the 1920s, mulatto lawyer and labour activist Evaristo de Moraes cited the United States as the ‘maximum expression’ of modern-day race prejudice, and pointedly contrasted its institutionalized segregation and lynchings with Brazil’s racial harmony, expressed in ‘the peaceful and productive fusion of the two races’.¹⁷ Much of the Afro-Brazilian press seemed to agree, running regular features on racial brutality and prejudice in the United States. ‘While the North American black removes his jacket and throws himself against the white in a bloody struggle, in the grip of mortal hatred; ... the Brazilian black extends a
fraternal hand to his white brothers, strengthening the ties of friendship which bind them."

Other Afro-Brazilian writers readily conceded the faults of the United States but cautioned that this did not necessarily mean that Brazil was racially egalitarian. Everyone knows, the newspaper Getulino observed in 1923, that in the United States ‘the black is considered to be a moral leper, and is treated like the most contemptible dog .... But to affirm from that that there is no colour prejudice in Brazil is like denying the defeat of Germany.' Getulino’s sister paper, O Clarim da Alvorada, initially disagreed: ‘In the United States, where prejudice is a fact, what belongs to the blacks belongs to the blacks, and what belongs to the whites belongs to the whites. But not here; everything that belongs to Brazil, belongs to us.’ By 1930, however, O Clarim’s position had shifted, and it now concurred, along with much of the black press, that ‘in Brazil, racial equality is a lie’.20

The Afro-Brazilian press commented not only on the obvious shortcomings of racial democracy: the discrimination which non-whites suffered in their pursuit of jobs, education, and other opportunities for upward mobility.21 It noted as well one of the ideology’s less obvious internal contradictions: while asserting the equality of all races, racial democracy simultaneously expressed a clear preference for racially mixed mulattoes over people of completely African ancestry.22 Some writers in the black press accepted the racial superiority of mulattoes over pretos (blacks), but most rejected the notion of mulatto superiority and its division of the Afro-Brazilian population into antagonistic and competing groups.23 Intellectuals and activists such as Vicente Ferreira (a preto) and José Correia Leite (a mulatto) sought to overcome this division by promoting the use of the word negro to group together people of mixed and unmixed African ancestry.24 But their efforts had little effect, and in 1947 Correia Leite ruefully observed that ‘in this nation of mestizos, it is only the blacks who have the courage’ to denounce racism. As a result, ‘we continue to be swallowed up by the sentimental lie that in Brazil there is no prejudice. But Brazil continues to be one enormous slave quarters, with a few blacks in the Big House.’

Criticisms of racial democracy were thus well developed among Afro-Brazilian intellectuals and in the black press during the
1930s and 1940s. These critiques, however, took place well outside the boundaries of mainstream intellectual, academic, and official discourse, where Freyre’s paradigm held unquestioned hegemony. Not until properly accredited ‘establishment’ writers and researchers started to question racial democracy would its hold on conceptions of national identity start to loosen. And that, in turn, did not happen until international events and influences started to press in on Brazil from outside its borders.

The first such event was a series of research projects on Brazilian race relations, carried out by Brazilian, United States, and French scholars during the early 1950s under the auspices of the newly created United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In response to the recent horrors of nazism and the Holocaust, UNESCO had adopted as part of its institutional mission the combating of racism throughout the world. Brazilian racial democracy seemed to offer a particularly promising alternative to such racism, and in an effort to understand how racial egalitarianism had come about in Brazil and how it functioned in practice, UNESCO’s Division of Social Sciences commissioned research teams in the two principal cities of the industrialized south-east — Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo — and in several small towns in Minas Gerais and the northeastern states of Bahia and Pernambuco. As often happens with research, the results were not what had been anticipated. All of the teams found high levels of inequality between the white and non-white populations, and abundant evidence of racist attitudes and stereotypes. Researchers in the north-east tended to see these inequalities as expressive more of class differences than racial differences — that is, blacks suffered discrimination and were looked down upon not because they were black but because they were poor. Researchers in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, by contrast, placed more emphasis on race-based prejudice and discrimination, noting the differences in treatment accorded to working-class whites and blacks, and the extreme difficulties experienced by educated, qualified blacks and mulattoes striving to enter or move upward in the middle class.

The second event coincided with the UNESCO projects. In 1950, renowned African-American dancer Katherine Dunham, on tour with her company in Brazil, was refused admission to the Hotel Esplanada in São Paulo, where she held reservations. This was not unusual treatment for African Americans — or, for that
matter, Afro-Brazilians — travelling in Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s. But Dunham’s international stature placed her in a category apart, and her vigorous denunciation of the incident provoked a national uproar and the passage by Congress the following year of Brazil’s first anti-discrimination statute, the Afonso Arinos Law.

Both events — the UNESCO research projects, and the Afonso Arinos Law — marked the first recognition by, respectively, academic and official authorities of serious flaws in Brazil’s racial democracy. Owing to loopholes in its enforcement provisions, the impact of the anti-discrimination law was quite modest, both at the time and afterwards. In the thirty-four years between its implementation in 1954 and its revision by the anti-discrimination provisions of the Constitution of 1988, there were only three convictions under the law, two of which resulted in suspended sentences. The research projects, however, left a more potent legacy. First, UNESCO’s interest in the problematic of race in Brazil stimulated considerable discussion, reflection, and writing by Afro-Brazilian activists and intellectuals in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Second, several of the young Brazilian scholars who had taken part — most notably Thales de Azevedo and Florestan Fernandes — subsequently went on to make the deconstruction of racial democracy one of the central concerns of their scholarly careers. They continued to publish critiques of Brazilian race relations into the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and trained younger scholars who followed the same line.

This small but highly provocative wave of research and writing cracked the wall of unanimity within the Brazilian academy on the question of racial democracy. There had been some tentative signs of dissent in the 1940s among young scholars in São Paulo, but the books and articles of the 1950s and 1960s marked the first major break from the semi-official orthodoxy. The military governments of the 1960s and 1970s reacted strongly to that break, denouncing criticisms of racial democracy as ‘acts of subversion’ carried out by ‘leftists ... seeking to create new sources of tension and dissatisfaction with the régime and its duly constituted authorities’. And Gilberto Freyre joined in the attack on ‘pseudo-sociologists’ and ‘communists’ who, in criticizing racial democracy, ‘act in an anti-Brazilian manner’ and suffer from ‘a lamentably anti-Brazilian attitude’.

Despite the government’s opposition to, and attempted
suppression of, criticisms of racial democracy, the tide running against the ideology proved impossible to stem, in part because of the dictatorship's own policies of national economic development. One of the tasks involved in making Brazil a geopolitical power was to improve its system of higher education, to which the régime gave high priority. The result was a dramatic increase in the size and number of Brazilian universities during the 1970s. This in turn meant an influx of young teaching staff, a number of whom had received advanced degrees abroad.

Gilberto Freyre's experiences as a student in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s had launched him on an intellectual journey which eventually led to the formulation of racial democracy. The experiences of Brazilians who came to study in the United States fifty years later, and particularly of those who ended up studying race, led in an almost diametrically opposed direction. State-enforced racial segregation had now been declared illegal, and the United States had embarked on a bold experiment to overcome segregation's legacy through policies of equal opportunity and affirmative action. Racially-based civil rights and black power movements were at the height of their influence in national life. And within the academy, theories and methods in the study of race were also changing. The rise of social history and 'bottom-up' perspectives on the past, and the use of new quantitative techniques, were redefining the study of slavery and race relations; similar changes were taking place in sociology, where quantitative and macro-structural approaches to the study of racial inequality were pushing aside earlier emphases on black social and cultural deviance.

The result of Brazilian students' exposure to these changes was a new wave of scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s that was even more critical of the Brazilian racial situation than the UNESCO studies had been. The São Paulo researchers of the 1950s had seen racial inequality and discrimination as an archaic survival from the period of slavery, which would gradually fade away as capitalist development and modernization opened up increasing opportunities for black upward mobility. But the US-educated scholars of the 1970s — most notably Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva — saw little evidence of such opening, despite the dramatic economic growth both of the 1950s and of the 'miracle' years of 1968–74. Rather, they showed through careful statistical analyses, based on national censuses and
household surveys, that blacks and mulattoes were clearly disadvantaged in relation to whites; and even in cases in which Afro-Brazilians brought competitive levels of education and work experience to the job market, they lagged far behind similarly prepared whites in terms of earnings and job advancement. The more education black job-seekers received, in fact, the further behind their white competitors they fell, both in absolute and relative terms.\(^37\)

The economic growth of the postwar period had indeed expanded opportunities for upward mobility in Brazil but had distributed those opportunities disproportionately to whites. This occurred despite substantial increases in the number of non-whites prepared to compete for those places. The same boom in higher education which had expanded the size of university faculties had also increased the number of Afro-Brazilian high school and college graduates. In 1950 only 48,000 Afro-Brazilians (out of a total black and brown population of 16.5 million) had graduated from high school, and only 4,000 from college. By 1987 those numbers had grown to 2.7 million and 485,000 respectively, out of a total non-white population of 59.3 million.\(^38\)

This was a level of educational achievement considerably lower than that of the white population; but it still produced a significant absolute number of non-white competitors for white-collar positions as office workers, executives, professionals, and technicians. As statistical studies and anecdotal evidence both indicated, however, when blacks and mulattoes sought to obtain those positions they encountered major obstacles of prejudice and discrimination.\(^39\)

As they pondered how to respond to these obstacles, educated Afro-Brazilians found their attention being drawn to foreign models. One was the national liberation movements of Portuguese Africa, mainly Marxist in orientation, which by the mid-1970s had won their nations' independence from Brazil's former metropolis. The other models were the civil rights and black power movements of the United States. As early as the 1920s and 1930s, during some of the darkest periods of racial oppression in the United States, Afro-Brazilian observers had noted a paradoxical positive effect of US-style segregation: the way it fostered black institutions and organizations and a sense of racial identity and community. As *O Clarim da Alvorada* observed in 1928:
Prejudice is a fact in the United States, the odious separation of races, and it was that prejudice that made the North American black a proud and haughty man.... He walks erect, facing down his terrible enemies, his own white countrymen. And in this way, the North American black always triumphs.

Another black paper, Progresso, agreed.

It is clear that if the blacks who live in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty had passively awaited a saving hand from some official entity, they would never have liberated themselves from the legal and economic servitude that vexed and oppressed them. It was through collective action ... that the black children of Uncle Sam succeeded in equalling all the other races in the arts, the sciences, and the economy.

Surveying the black colleges, churches, businesses, civic organizations, and other African-American institutions that had no counterpart in Brazil, O Clarim speculated that perhaps 'blatant, open prejudice is a stimulus to black competence and ability'.

As those African-American organizations struggled against discrimination and inequality, black writers and intellectuals in Brazil took notice, first of those organizations' efforts and then as time went on of their achievements. During the late 1940s the newspaper Alvorada ran articles on E. Philip Randolph, the ending of segregation in the US armed forces, and other advances in the campaign against segregation, noting that prejudice and discrimination seemed to be on the decline in the United States while they were simultaneously increasing in Brazil. As segregation was then overturned during the 1950s and 1960s, the Afro-Brazilian press noted the clear improvements in the racial situation there, and ascribed the credit to the black civil rights movement. Thus by the 1970s, as upwardly mobile non-whites began to create their own organizations and movements to combat the racial barriers that they confronted, many looked toward the US civil rights and black power movements as possible models for emulation.

Those models appealed most strongly to members of the Afro-Brazilian middle class. Among the black working class, the United States presented another model of collective action, but of a quite different sort. During the 1970s, working-class black youths in Rio, São Paulo, and other south-eastern cities began holding large week-end dances based on American soul music,
which they attended wearing clothes and hair styles modelled on the ‘Afro’ styles of the United States. This ‘Black Soul’ movement (the English words were used), with its importation of cultural and musical styles from abroad, was seen by many Brazilians, both black and white, as an affront to Brazilian national identity and a direct threat to Brazilian traditions of racial harmony and co-existence.\(^4\) But as several students of the movement have noted, this was exactly the point: traditional forms of Afro-Brazilian music and dance, such as samba, had been so thoroughly co-opted as expressions of *brasilidade* (Brazilianess) that young Afro-Brazilians wishing to express an independent, oppositional identity had to reach outside the national cultural lexicon to do so. And when they did, North American (and Caribbean — Bob Marley, Jimmy Cliff, and other reggae stars were also prominently featured at the Black Soul gatherings) racial consciousness seemed made to order. James Brown’s ‘Say It Loud: I’m Black and I’m Proud’ may have had as much impact in Brazil during those years as in the United States.\(^45\)

Finally, racial politics in Brazil were affected by events in the United States in yet another way: the sponsorship by US foundations of Brazilian scholarship and activism on race. This began in the 1970s with grants by the Inter-American and Ford Foundations to several Afro-Brazilian cultural and community organizations. In part because of its work with those allegedly ‘subversive’ organizations, the Inter-American Foundation was banned from Brazil by the military government in 1978; and since its return to the country in 1982 it has made no further grants to black entities.\(^46\) The Ford Foundation, by contrast, was allowed to operate freely throughout this period. Its grants were crucially important in supporting a variety of projects centred on the problematic of race: scholarly conferences and publications, the creation of archives on black history, cultural and community activities, and travel to the United States by Brazilian scholars, intellectuals and activists to meet and consult with their American counterparts.\(^47\) In the 1990s it funded two major new initiatives: a national campaign to persuade Afro-Brazilians to ‘não deixar sua cor passar em branco’ — not count themselves as white in the national census of 1991\(^48\) — and a programme of scholarships to send graduate students specializing in Afro-Brazilian studies to United States universities for advanced degrees.
Thus, over the course of the second half of the century, a number of external influences combined to undermine the ideological hegemony of racial democracy in Brazil. These included visits and commentary by US citizens, both black and white; the UNESCO research projects; graduate training of young Brazilian scholars in the United States; the example of US black movements, both cultural and political; and the activities of American foundations in Brazil. These external influences were particularly strongly felt among two groups spawned by the university ‘boom’ of the 1970s: Afro-Brazilian high-school and college graduates ready and able to compete with whites for entry into the middle class, and frustrated by the racial barriers which prevented them from doing so; and a new generation of university professors, some of whom carried out innovative research on Brazilian racial inequality as part of their larger critique of social inequality in Brazil more generally. Black activists and (largely) white academics found themselves converging in their opposition to racial democracy, a convergence symbolized by the successful joint campaign of the Instituto de Pesquisa das Culturas Negras and the Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais to restore race, removed by the military government as a category of information from the census of 1970, to the census of 1980.49 The racial inequalities documented in that census in turn provided additional ammunition for attacks on what was increasingly termed the ‘myth’ of racial democracy.

As a result of those attacks, during the 1980s racial democracy lost its unquestioned dominance in Brazilian national life. This was evident, first, in the highly revisionist rhetoric surrounding the centennial of Brazilian emancipation in 1988, including declarations by high government officials and political figures; and second, in the incorporation of greatly strengthened (as compared to the Afonso Arinos Law) anti-discrimination provisions in the constitution of 1988.50 Still, reports of the ideology’s death are greatly exaggerated. Its critics, vocal and effective though they may be, remain a minority in Brazilian society. And the very ‘foreignness’ of their criticisms, which tend to be based on models and assumptions alien to Brazil’s historical experience, make those criticisms difficult for most Brazilians to identify with and respond to. Thus racial democracy, and its dark underside of frank, unreflective racism, remain much in evidence in Brazilian
society at both the elite and popular levels, and will continue to exercise influence over that society for some time to come.51

Meanwhile, what of the other side of this American counterpoint? Clearly, the United States' racial dilemma has had significant impact over time on the racial situation in Brazil; to what degree has the reverse been true?

During the first half of the 1900s white and black Americans alike took notice of, and for the most part accepted, Brazil’s claims to be a racial democracy. Following a visit to Brazil in 1914, Theodore Roosevelt reported:

If I were asked to name one point in which there is a complete difference between the Brazilians and ourselves, I should say it was in the attitude to the black man.... [In Brazil] any Negro or mulatto who shows himself fit is without question given the place to which his abilities entitle him.52

Commenting on Roosevelt’s observations, W.E.B. DuBois’s newspaper The Crisis concurred that ‘there is no color bar to advancement’ in Brazil. The Baltimore Afro-American reported in 1916 that Brazil ‘offers first-hand knowledge of the solving of the race question’ and urged its readers to consider emigrating there.

It would seem that Brazil would be to the educated colored man of today, what [the] United States was to the European in 1850 — a new land and a land of promise. From the point of view of climate and tradition, Brazil is the country peculiarly fitted to receive the colored man of this country, and offer him a vision of freedom and opportunity beyond his wildest dreams.53

Other black newspapers, including the Atlanta Independent, the Negro World, and the Chicago Defender, ran similar articles during the 1910s and 1920s, encouraging black migration to Brazil.54 African Americans who pursued this idea, however, soon discovered Brazilian consular authorities’ continuing commitment to the ‘whitening thesis’, many of them being denied visas to enter the country, even as tourists.55 By the 1940s the attitude of the US black press toward Brazil was beginning to shift. DuBois was in the forefront, writing in 1941 that the race mixture celebrated by Freyre and other proponents of racial democracy
does not envisage any decrease of power and prestige among whites ... but rather an inclusion within the so-called white group of a considerable infiltration of dark blood, while at the same time maintaining the social bar, economic exploitation, and political disfranchisement of dark blood as such.... Thus racial amalgamation in Latin-America does not always or even usually carry with it social uplift and planned effort to raise the mulatto and mestizoes to freedom in a democratic polity.

The *Baltimore Afro-American*, which in 1916 had urged black migration to Brazil, ran a series of articles in 1940 on ‘The Color Line in South America’s Largest Republic’. George Schuyler, publisher of the *Pittsburgh Courier*, published a similarly negative report on ‘Brazilian Color Bias’ following his 1948 visit to Brazil, and went on during the 1950s to publish occasional articles from the Afro-Brazilian monthly *Quilombo*, edited by activist Abdias do Nascimento.\(^56\)

Academic opinion in the United States was slower to reverse itself. During the 1940s, US scholars remained strongly admiring of racial democracy, particularly when contrasting Brazilian race relations with the segregation and discrimination documented in Gunnar Myrdal’s landmark study, *An American Dilemma: The Negro and Modern Democracy* (1944).\(^57\) Research carried out by Donald Pierson on race relations in Bahia, and the major comparative study by Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (1946), kept firmly to the lines traced by Gilberto Freyre. Tannenbaum’s book opened, in fact, with a tribute to ‘the freshness and lucidity’ of ‘everything that Gilberto Freyre writes’, and then went on to extend Freyre’s arguments concerning Brazil to Latin America as a whole.\(^58\)

It was American and European scholars’ faith in the virtues of racial democracy that led to the UNESCO research projects of the early 1950s. The negative findings of those projects inspired a second wave of comparative work in the 1970s. Indeed, one is struck by the degree to which US comparativists have followed the lead set by major Brazilian researchers: while Tannenbaum based much of his analysis on Freyre, a second generation of comparativists in the late 1960s and 1970s drew equally heavily on the UNESCO revisionists, particularly Florestan Fernandes, and as a result constructed much more ambivalent comparisons between the United States and Brazil.\(^59\) And the even more critical visions of Brazilian scholars writing in the 1970s and 1980s are now just beginning to produce a third wave of comparative
efforts in the United States that essentially reverse Freyre’s and Tannenbaum’s original vision. Thomas Skidmore’s recent examination of racial categories and taxonomy in the two countries considers long-standing assertions of the fundamental difference between the United States’ dichotomous black-white system and Brazil’s more flexible black-brown-white colour continuum, and concludes that those assertions ‘will not stand up to analysis of the quantitative data’ generated by Brazilian researchers. As Silva, Hasenbalg, and others have demonstrated, Brazil’s black and mulatto populations do not differ greatly from each other on most social and economic indicators — life expectancy, earnings, education — while both groups are clearly differentiated from whites. Brazilian race relations thus appear far more bi-polar than has traditionally been thought; conversely, black/white dichotomy in the United States is breaking down in the face of both massive emigration from Latin America and Asia and of new multi-racial identities. The fastest-growing racial and ethnic groups in the United States are, to borrow the title of Degler’s comparative study, ‘neither black nor white’.60

Further reversing traditional terms of comparison between the United States and Brazil is a recent examination of statistical indicators which finds that during the first half of the 1900s Brazil was the more racially egalitarian of the two countries. Since the 1950s, however, that relationship has been reversed, making the United States, in statistical terms, ‘the more racially equal — or perhaps better put, the less unequal — of the two societies’. After falling during the 1960s and 1970s, indices of racial inequality increased in the United States during the 1980s. Nevertheless, they still remained lower than those in Brazil, leading the author to conclude that the United States offers ‘more convincing evidence of racial democracy’ than does Brazil.61

In this recent work, the terms of the US–Brazil comparison have been radically altered. Not only is Brazil no longer a racial democracy, its system of race relations is no longer considered superior to that of the United States in almost any way.62 Is this excessive revisionism? Time, and the next turn of the scholarly wheel, will tell. In the meantime, we may conclude by noting how the wheel has turned to date, and how it has been driven forward by trans-hemispheric intellectual exchange.
Over the course of the century a sequence of Brazilian scholars and intellectuals — Gilberto Freyre in the 1930s and 1940s, Florestan Fernandes and the UNESCO revisionists in the 1950s and 1960s, Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva in the 1970s and 1980s — produced major reconceptualizations of Brazilian race relations. They were moved to do so, in large part, because of their contact, either direct or indirect, with the United States: Freyre, Hasenbalg and Silva through their studies in the US, and Fernandes through his intellectual contacts, first with the Chicago school of sociology, and then with the Social Science Division of UNESCO. Those reconceptualizations in turn shaped the analyses carried out by succeeding generations of North American comparativists: Tannenbaum, Harris, van den Berghe, Degler, Toplin, Skidmore, and others.

This pattern would suggest that the next turn of the wheel will require further reconceptualization which will originate in Brazil, but in response, again in part, to stimuli and provocation from the United States. It would also suggest that such reconceptualization is imminent, and will take place in this decade. One is struck by the almost clock-like periodicity of the exchange to date. Brazilian thinkers formulate a new, revised vision of race relations in their country, following which, ten to fifteen years later, North American scholars respond with new comparative syntheses. Thus, Freyre in the 1930s, followed by Tannenbaum in the 1940s; the UNESCO researchers in the 1950s, followed by van den Berghe, Degler, Skidmore and others in the late 1960s and early 1970s; then Hasenbalg and Silva in the late 1970s, followed by new comparative efforts in the early 1990s. The exchange is just as regular at the Brazilian end, where each major reformulation follows by five to ten years North American comparative efforts: after Tannenbaum, the UNESCO researchers, and after Degler et al., Hasenbalg and Silva.

Should this pattern hold, the comparative efforts of the 1990s would seem to presage a new Brazilian formulation shortly before or after the year 2000. And though one hesitates to forecast in such a mechanical way, there is in fact good reason to anticipate such a development. Brazil is currently in the grip of a profound economic, social, and political crisis that has wrecked the country since the restoration of civilian rule in 1985. Inflation, poverty, hunger and starvation, political corruption, street crime — each of these problems, long endemic, has intensi-
ified dramatically during the last ten years, pushing Brazil, it is not too much to say, to the very edge of a moral crisis of national identity.\(^6\) An earlier such moment of national upheaval, in the 1930s, launched Gilberto Freyre on his re-creation of the Brazilian past, present, and future. One suspects that the current crisis is prompting similar soul-searching among Brazilian intellectuals, and analogous re-imaginings of Brazil as a society and a nation. And since the question of race remains as central to Brazilian national identity in the 1990s as it was in the 1930s, those imaginings and visions are likely to include yet another ‘paradigm shift’ in Brazilian conceptualizations of their multi-racial society. Just as Freyre’s monumental work began to gestate during his years as a student in Texas and New York, so perhaps the seeds of such a shift are germinating at this very moment in the minds of those students of Afro-Brazilian history, society, and culture currently enrolled in US universities. If so, their work will constitute yet another chapter in a continuing, century-long American counterpoint.

Notes

1. As of 1987 (results from the 1991 census have not yet been fully tabulated), Brazil’s black and brown population was 59.3 million, out of a total population of 138.5 million. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (hereafter IBGE), Pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicílios — 1987. Cor da população (Rio de Janeiro 1990), vol. 1, 2–3.


6. Thomas W. Merrick and Douglas H. Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil, 1800 to the Present (Baltimore 1979), 92. These immigrants, and their Brazilian-born offspring, represented a substantial addition to Brazil’s population, which was only 14 million in 1890, and 31 million in 1920.


8. On the stresses caused by Europeanization, see Boris Fausto, Trabalho urbano e conflito social, 1890–1920 (São Paulo 1977); Sheldon Maram, Anarquistas, imigrantes, e o movimento operário brasileiro, 1890–1920 (Rio de Janeiro 1979); Sidney Chalhoub, Trabalho, lar e botequim: Vida cotidiana e controle social da classe trabalhadora no Rio de Janeiro da Belle Époque (São Paulo 1986); June Hahner, Poverty and Politics: The Urban Poor in Brazil, 1870–1920 (Albuquerque 1986).


11. See Freyre’s three-part history of Brazil, Casa grande e senzala (1933), Sobrados e mucambos (1936), and Ordem e progresso (1959), translated into English as The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in Brazilian Civilization (New York 1946); The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of Modern Brazil (New York 1963); and Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic (New York 1970). See also his English-language syntheses, Brazil: An
Interpretation (New York 1945) and New World in the Tropics (New York 1959).


14. Freyre, Mansions and Shanties, 416, 431.

15. Writing in 1945, Freyre directly contrasted Brazilian racial democracy to nazi racism, arguing that ‘we are unable to conceive of a society with tendencies more opposed to those of the Germanic Weltanschauung’. Freyre, Masters and the Slaves, xiv.


17. Evaristo de Moraes, ‘Expansão de um preconceito’, Getulino, 10 February 1924, 1; Evaristo de Moraes, Brancos e negros nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro 1922), 55.


22. Freyre himself stressed that it was mulattoes, not blacks, who had reaped the benefits of Brazil’s racial egalitarianism. See ‘The Rise of the College Graduate and the Mulatto’ in Mansions and Shanties, 354–99.


25. José Correia Leite, ‘Preconceito, casa grande, e senzala’, Alvorada (March 1947), 1. This was an ironic reference to Freyre’s first book, Casa
grande e senzala (Big House and Slave Quarters).


34. See, for example, Oracy Nogueira, ‘Atitude desfavorável de alguns anunciantes de São Paulo em relação aos empregados de cor’, *Sociologia*, 4, 4 (1942), 328–58.

35. Azevedo, *Democracia racial*, 53 n27.

36. Gilberto Freyre, ‘A propósito de preconceito de raça no Brasil’, *O
37. The seminal works in this area were Hasenbalg’s and Silva’s PhD dissertations: Carlos A. Hasenbalg, ‘Race Relations in Post-Abolition Brazil: The Smooth Preservation of Racial Inequalities’ (University of California–Berkeley 1978), subsequently published in Brazil as Discriminação e desigualdades raciais no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro 1979); Nelson do Valle Silva, ‘Black–White Income Differentials: Brazil, 1960’ (University of Michigan 1978). For their later work, see their essays in Fontaine, Race, Class and Power, and their co-authored books, Estrutura social, mobilidade e raça (Rio de Janeiro 1988) and Relações raciais no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro 1992). For other important work of this type, see Oliveira et al., op. cit., Lovell, op. cit., and work published in the journal edited by Hasenbalg, Estudos Afro-Asiáticos. See also work by Afro-Brazilian sociologist Clóvis Moura: O negro: De bom escravo a mau cidadão? (Rio de Janeiro 1977); Sociologia do negro brasileiro (São Paulo 1988); Dialética radical do Brasil negro (São Paulo 1994).


39. For vivid anecdotal evidence, see Haroldo Costa, Fala, crioulo (Rio de Janeiro 1982).

40. ‘Na terra do preconceito’, O Clarim da Alvorada, 4 March 1928, 3; ‘Povo que não se abate’, Progresso, 15 November 1931, 3; ‘Eduquemos nosso povo’, O Clarim da Alvorada, 28 September 1931, 4. See also ‘Aos nossos leitores’, O Alfinete, 3 September 1918, 1.

41. ‘Corajosa afirmação’, Alvorada, February 1947, 1; and the regular feature ‘Mundo Negro’.


44. Not surprisingly, Gilberto Freyre was in the forefront of the protesters. See his op-ed piece, ‘Atenção brasileiros’ [Watch Out, Brazilians], Diário de Pernambuco, 15 May 1977, quoted in Hanchard, op. cit., 115.


47. An interesting article is waiting to be written on the Ford Foundation’s activities in this area. This paragraph is based on my own participation in some of those projects and conversations over the years with Foundation programme officers and consultants.

48. Regina Domingues, ‘The Colour of a Majority without Citizenship’, Conexões, 4, 2 (November 1992), 6–7. Brazilian census-takers are required to accept individuals’ own assessments of their racial identity, and it is often surmised that many Afro-Brazilians label themselves as white. See Charles Wood, ‘Categorias censitárias e classificações subjetivas de raça no Brasil’ in
Lovell, op. cit., 93–111.

49. ‘Censo-80 vai pesquisar cor, decide o IBGE’, Folha de São Paulo, 9 November 1979, 6.

50. At ceremonies in the national capital marking the centennial, Minister of Culture Celso Furtado, whose ministry was in charge of co-ordinating the national festivities, declared that ‘the idea that there is racial democracy in Brazil is false as long as the overwhelming majority of the black population lives marginalized and in poverty’. ‘Vem ai cem anos de ebulação’, A Gazeta, 13 May 1988, 13. Workers’ Party presidential candidate Luis Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, who received 47 per cent of the national vote in the elections of 1989, denounced racial democracy as ‘de facto apartheid’, representing ‘the supremacy of a dominant white élite who see a direct correlation between skin colour and possibilities of access to rights and power’. Luis Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, ‘A mistificação da democracia racial’, Folha de São Paulo, 16 February 1988, 3. On the events of 1988, see Andrews, Blacks and Whites, 211–33; Hanchard, op. cit., 142-54; Yvonne Maggie, Catálogo: Centenário da abolição (Rio de Janeiro 1989).

51. See, for example, anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes’s discussion, based on her field work in a north-eastern Brazilian city, of how ‘the ideology of “racial democracy” ... [is passing] unchallenged, uncontested, into another generation’, accompanied by ‘racist sentiments that were previously disallowed, at least publicly’. Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil (Berkeley 1992), 90, 92.


57. Myrdal’s study exemplifies several phenomena noted in this article: transnational influences on the conceptualization of racial problems (Myrdal was a Swedish sociologist); and the role of American foundations in promoting such transnationalization (his project was commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation). See David W. Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of An American Dilemma, 1944–1969 (Baton Rouge 1987).


59. This ambivalence is nicely captured in the title of Carl Degler’s Neither Black nor White; see also his comments on how he found ‘the nuances of race
relations in Brazil so complex and yet so simple, so different from, and yet so similar to, those in the United States ...' (x). See also Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York 1967); Robert Brent Toplin, Freedom and Prejudice: The Legacy of Slavery in the United States and Brazil (Westport, CT 1981), both of which are strongly influenced by Fernandes. Marvin Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas (New York 1964), accepts Freyre's and Tannenbaum's descriptions of the Brazilian situation — flexible racial identities, absence of colour bars, relative integration of non-whites into national life — but proposes materialist rather than cultural explanations for that situation. See also Thomas E. Skidmore, 'Toward a Comparative Analysis of Race Relations since Abolition in Brazil and the United States', Journal of Latin American Studies, 4, 1 (1972), 1–28.


62. This reversal can be seen in the unintended irony of a Brazilian newspaper article on racism in the United States, in which the author reports her surprise at finding it to be just as bad as in Brazil. 'O racismo nos EUA, igualzinho ao Brasil', O São Paulo, 30 March 1984, 6.

63. Two of these figures — Fernandes's collaborator Roger Bastide, and Carlos Hasenbalg — were in fact not Brazilians. Bastide was French, and Hasenbalg is Argentine. However, both lived in Brazil for extended periods — Bastide for sixteen years, Hasenbalg for over twenty — and became thoroughly integrated into the Brazilian intellectual community.
